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## A PACIFIST PROGRAM FOR PREPAREDNESS

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*The Advocate of Peace (1894-1920)*

Pan Americanism is not only a model for Europe; it is a warning as well. Before the war there was much talk of the "American menace," by which was meant economic competition. This menace exists even in a wider sense. A continent so well organized will only too easily win precedence over divided Europe. If that disorganization which has led to war should continue after the war, the danger of the associated states of Pan-America outstripping Europe will be far greater. The war has changed the relative position of Europe and America, and that not to the advantage of Europe. Europe will lag behind America, because of its disorganization, and also because of its exhaustion. Hence a Co-operative Union must be formed, that a united Europe may meet that united continent across the ocean—not for attack, but to make further co-operation possible.

The Pan European Union need not slavishly follow the American model. It should be adapted to the peculiar conditions of Europe. Since the relations between the European states are more intimate than those between the American republics; since they are so much closer geographically; since their interests are more complicated and the possibilities of conflict more abundant, the assemblies should occur at least every three years. In the meantime there should be a *Pan European Bureau*, a central organ for the Union, exercising wide powers in co-operation with the permanent delegates of the various governments. This bureau should have its seat in the capital or a leading city of neutral European country. While the Hague Conferences and the Hague Bureaus would develop the legal relations of the

nations, the Pan European Bureau and the Pan European Conferences of the Union would control and promote international relations and set the wheels of organization into motion.

Such co-operation in the practical necessities of life would soon react upon *political life*. Despite the independence which would be preserved to the individual states—or perhaps on account of it—the Pan European Union would not be without influence on the political conditions of the continent. Continuous co-operation would emphasize the economic and cultural interdependence on the old continent. In time political differences would lose some of their menacing character, and means of reconciliation would quite easily be found. A condition favorable to the effectiveness of the Hague machinery would thus be created. Such a union would strengthen legal co-operation, and create that will to law, the absence of which has condemned the Hague Tribunal to impotence.

A European Union is at present more desirable than a world-wide one. The European states must first become accustomed to co-operate in their own European affairs without complicating them with world considerations. Where broader matters are at issue, these can best be settled, as before, by world-wide conferences or through those international bureaus which already exist. Often the co-operation of the Pan American and the Pan European unions will be necessary, and it may be taken for granted that such a co-operation would finally develop into a *World Union (Weltzweckverband)*.

## A PACIFIST PROGRAM FOR PREPAREDNESS

By LUCIA AMES MEAD

THE militarists have chosen a clever slogan which is half the battle. All who love foresight, caution, prudence believe in preparedness for all probable exigencies. Up to date, the public seems to be unaware that any kind of preparedness is conceivable, apart from increase of war preparation, except the formation of that far-off world organization which does not deal with immediate problems and that exercise of brotherly love for which professor and congressman, as much as the men in the street, have a profound contempt.

But the pacifist does not ignore immediate problems and has a constructive plan to offer, as well as a protest to make against the hysteria which disgraces America today, and which has perhaps had no counterpart, so far as educated men are concerned, since the witchcraft delusion. Men learned in mathematics, language, and law, now as they did then, seem hypnotized and obsessed. Even college graduates appear as incapable of perceiving relations of cause and effect in our political policy now, as their forbears were two hundred and fifty years ago, of dealing with the phenomena of nature as affected by old women and black cats.

The pacifist program presupposes the truth of Dr. Charles W. Eliot's recent statement that "the danger of a European or Oriental invasion is almost infinitesimal." It also presupposes that this country could never be in-

vaded, and therefore never need a citizen army if it expends its usual naval budget for those submarines, mines, and other coast defenses that have prevented the greatest navy in the world from bombarding a single German port and which have prevented the allied fleets from going through the Dardanelles; and if our Government through legislation lessens possible dangers.

A citizen army, trained to rifle practice, would be as futile for us as it has been necessary for little Switzerland, surrounded with old enemies a yard across her border. Moreover, rifle shooting has proved the least important feature of this war, even when fought across adjacent borders. To prepare for possible dangers is madness. We can reasonably prepare only for probable dangers. In the whole history of our Republic we have never been attacked, but ourselves began three quite unnecessary foreign wars. These facts are ignored in the present craze for a futile type of preparedness.

While not, at this time, asking for disarmament or limitation of armaments, the pacifist does ask for an honest, economical expenditure of a naval budget which shall at least be no larger than was that of last year, and which shall be spent solely for purely defensive measures on our coast, and not for still larger battleships, which can only raise the standard of size and expense for the battleships of all nations and which would soon nullify any advantage that they at first gained.

The pacifist proclaims that no successful invasion was ever made by any nation fighting beyond seas, and that no Teutonic or Oriental power could embark sufficient troops, with supplies and fuel and artillery, and approach our shores without, according to careful calculation, giving us at least two months' warning, and without leaving itself dangerously exposed at home.

We are being fooled by the doctrine that if only England had had a million trained men at the start this war might not have happened. But, as *The Westminster Gazette* declared: "It would simply have come sooner."

The following methods are proposed to diminish those possible dangers against which all war preparations are now being made, and which would be vastly more effective in promoting security than the multiplication of armaments would be.

1. *Demand by the United States Government that the Third Hague Conference be called at the earliest possible moment after the war, and immediate plans made by the Government as to the measures which it will propose to the signatory powers to place on the program for the Conference.*

2. *Announcement by our Government of its intention to ask the signatories to the Third Hague Conference to neutralize the Latin republics, and thus abolish all excuse for a great navy in the Atlantic to uphold the Monroe Doctrine.*

This doctrine, largely expanded since its inception, is now both vague and menacing to the world's peace. It is impossible to believe that any signatory nations could refuse to join in this concerted guarantee without advertising its intention of future aggression. No nation would have anything to lose by such a guarantee, as it knows our intention to fight for its maintenance, even if we have to do it alone. Such an announcement now could change the whole plan for "preparedness," and open up hitherto unconceived possibilities. It could give us at no cost what we now plan to achieve at enormous cost and with ever-increasing danger. The leading Latin republics might well be asked to join with us in this request. Should the neutralization prove impracticable, a Pan-American doctrine should replace the present Monroe Doctrine.

3. *Passage of a bill, already approved by the American Bar Association and urged by Ex-President Taft, which would give federal control and protection over aliens.*

This would lessen possible friction with Japan, and not leave the National Government helpless as it was when Italians were lynched in New Orleans some years ago and Louisiana would not make redress.

4. *A Government Commission of Americans of experience in the Orient, and who hold no political office, and one chosen from eminent Orientals to study the adjustment of all difficulties between our country and China and Japan, to the end that justice and good-will be achieved. This should carefully consider Prof. Sidney L. Gulick's proposals for a solution of the immigration problem so as to put China and Japan on a par with other nations, and at the same time prevent any undue influx of Orientals.*

These commissions would demonstrate the fact that Japan's sole ambitions are for development in Asia, and that all she asks of us is justice. If we refuse to give her that, we do so at our peril. Nations fight now in

groups. She is now fighting with allies, and if she ever fought us it would be with an ally behind her.

5. *A promise of independence to the Philippines in the near future and the securing of their neutralization by agreement of all nations interested.*

This would enable us, in the words of a naval officer, "to cut down our navy one-half." It would relieve the apprehensions of those natives who dread American exploitation and the neighborhood of a great American fleet. It would greatly lessen the likelihood of militarism spreading through peace-loving China and the sad diversion of its small resources from education and internal development into costly, short-lived armaments. It would not mean the shirking of any moral obligations, but rather the help of 700,000,000 in Asia and America, instead of merely 7 to 8,000,000 Filipinos. We could still help them in education, and doubtless would be asked to supply paid advisers, as other Asiatic nations have asked us to do. The price of an eighteen-million-dollar battleship given to the Filipinos for education to be administered by ourselves, would be six times as much money as we have ever given them. It will be remembered that they have themselves paid for their education as well as all their other expenses. Our sole gift has been \$3,000,000 in the cholera season. A generous gift now to hasten their fitness for self-government by 1925 would relieve tension; it would impress all Asia, and it would be the shrewdest measure that we could adopt to secure permanent, friendly relations beyond sea.

Even should much blundering and some civil strife ensue after independence were granted, it would be no more than we, as well as all other republics, have experienced, and should not deter us from letting the Filipinos learn by doing, especially when our position in the Orient is not for the benefit of all Asia and weakens our power at home.

The neutralization of an isolated archipelago could be secured with assurance that no possible excuse could be given for its invasion such as was offered for the invasion of Belgium.

6. *The announcement by our Government of its policy to take the initiative in forming a League of Nations, perhaps beginning with the American republics, and as soon as possible to include all nations, pledged to settle all their difficulties between each other by diplomacy, law, or conciliation, and to use concerted non-intercourse as a penalty for faithlessness to this pledge.*

This non-intercourse, if carried out completely, would involve cancellation of passports, copyrights, and patents, and the cutting off of all communication by shipping, railroad, wire, and wireless, and would prohibit war loans. Such a punishment has never yet been inflicted on any nation. It would become more and more terrible according to the number of the nations within the League. The small states of Europe, like Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, whose joint forces might amount to little, could exercise enormous power in cutting off transmission of supplies. A supertax, or higher tariffs, might be inflicted on a nation that remained obdurate, the amount received to help offset the losses of the nations most inconvenienced by this non-intercourse. While obvious difficulties will at once be recognized, the question to be considered is, What is the

*alternative?* Every method of coercion has difficulties. Shall we try this, or remain content with that which is ruining Europe today?

*7. Preparedness to save for real defensive purposes the 600,000 Americans who annually perish from preventable causes, and who have died in less time than Great Britain has lost 600,000 soldiers.*

Germany's best preparation for war was her preparation of her citizens' minds and bodies for peace. As an astute business man, George W. Perkins, has declared: "We as a nation are unprepared for peace." Ill health, reckless loss of life, inefficiency, waste of natural resources, clumsy national housekeeping, as well as graft and greed, create an unpreparedness that would seriously handicap us were we at war. It is significant that Great Britain is now beginning her training of raw recruits with physical training, not military drill, doing in this exigency what civic gymnasia and better education ought to have done long before.

The pacifist believes in real defense for real dangers, but not in preposterous preparedness for hypothetical dangers.

With Norman Angell, he perceives that defence is never for a country, but for that country's policy. Have we any clear policies?

The greatest danger that threatens us today is the

poisonous doctrine which is fast making our people panic stricken, suspicious, and is placing a new reliance on force. Prussia is fast conquering us by her theories. Millions of Americans are now convinced that governments rest on force, and that only by increased force can we be safe.

If a bleeding, poverty-stricken Europe is a new menace to us, it is a new menace to the world. If this, the safest nation in the world, feels compelled to increase war preparations, all other nations must follow our example.

Upon our decision hangs the world's decision. When Bismarck was persuaded against his better judgment to take Alsace-Lorraine, he laid the foundation for war in the west which has dragged not only France, but Belgium, England, Canada, Africa, Australia, India, and Japan into war. When Disraeli broke the treaty of San Stefano, he laid the foundation of Balkan strife and the present war in the east. Today we ourselves are laying the foundation for rivalry, ambition, and future trouble. Money, misinformation, and fear are about to force us on the downward path that will lead to world conscription, and probably a future world war, unless in the providence of God blind eyes are opened in time and a strong hand is stretched forth to save us from fatal folly.

## EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR ON CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA\*

By WALTER SCOTT PENFIELD

ONE who has never studied carefully the commercial relations existing between Latin America and some of the present warring nations of Europe, and the economic dependence of the southern continent on Europe, would be likely to conclude that the countries of Latin America are independent economically, thriving by trade among themselves. At least it would be hard to conceive how these nations, located as they are thousands of miles from the seat of belligerent operations, would be likely to suffer to any perceptible degree.

But the statistics show the opposite to be true. The economic and financial depression produced in the civilized world by the gigantic war that at present disturbs Europe has made itself felt with especial force in the Iberian Republics. The export and import trade has fallen, and with it the customs revenues, from which Latin America draws almost entirely for the payment of governmental expense. With the diminishing of foreign commerce has come hand in hand the slackening of domestic trade. The supply of European made goods has been or is being rapidly exhausted, and those depending on this trade have been made to suffer. Correspondingly the European demand for domestic products has decreased, and those dependent on such sales have been compelled to retrench.

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As the citizens of a state prosper, so prospers the state, and as they suffer economically, so suffers the state. Thus the treasuries of governments have become impoverished, and, in order to replenish them, foreign loans have been resorted to and additional taxes have been levied, all of which add to the weight which the already overburdened business man is compelled to bear.

### THE A. B. C. REPUBLICS.

In the short space of time allotted to me, it would be impossible to discuss in detail all the effects of the war on these countries. Witness the decline of the export and import trade in the three countries known diplomatically as the A. B. C. Republics, namely, Argentine, Brazil, and Chile.

Before proceeding, I should call your attention to the fact that the statistics for this year are not yet available and that my comparison will be made between the years 1913 and 1914. Also, it should be borne in mind that the war began in August, 1914, and that the figures which I give would tell a still different story if it had started in January of that year.

The Argentine gold peso is worth 97 cents in United States money. In 1913, the Argentine Republic imported goods of the value of 421,000,000 pesos. In 1914, these figures fell to 271,000,000 pesos, or a total loss of approximately 35 per cent. In 1913, her exports amounted to 483,000,000 pesos, which were lowered in